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NOTE 
Rejection Versus Termination: A Sublessee's 
Rights in a Lease Rejected in a Bankruptcy 
Proceeding Under 11U.S.C.§365(d)(4) 
Vivek Sankaran 
When a party files for bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the United 
States Code, 1 the court typically appoints a trustee to handle all of the 
party's financial obligations.2 The trustee's responsibilities include in­
vestigating the financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the 
business, the desirability of continuing the business, and any other 
matter relevant to the disposition of the bankrupt estate.3 
If a bankrupt party holds a commercial lease, 4 the trustee possesses 
two options for dealing with the lease. 5 One option is to reject the 
lease, which ends the bankrupt party's obligation to adhere to the pro­
visions of the lease.6 The trustee may decide to reject the lease because 
the rent of the property is above the market price or because the par-
1. 1 1U.S.C. § 365 (1994). Chapter 11 provides bankrupt parties: 
(T]he legal option of assuming the contract, thereby receiving the benefits of its provisions at 
the costs of meetings its obligations on a priority basis, or rejecting the contract, thereby 
foregoing all benefits but absolving themselves of further obligations and relegating the 
other party to the status of pre-petition creditor for unsatisfied liabilities. 
Laura B. Bartell, Revisiting Rejection: Secured Party Interests in Leases and Executory Con­
tracts, 103 DICK. L. REV. 497, 498 (1999). 
2. 1 1  u.s.c. §§ 1104-1106. 
3. § 1106(a)(3). 
4. § 365(d)(4) only involves the assumption or rejection of an "unexpired lease of non­
residential real property." Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, this Note focuses on the rejec­
tion of commercial leases. 
5. § 365(a). 
6. Rejection is a bankrupt party's decision not to assume the obligations set forth in the 
lease. See Eastover Bank for Sav. v. Sowashee Venture (In re Austin Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d 
1077, 1082 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Throughout § 365, rejection refers to the debtor's decision not to 
assume a burdensome lease or executory contract."); Commercial Trading Co. v. Lansburgh 
(In re Garfinkle), 577 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1978) ("(A)ssumption and rejection refer to the 
bankruptcy trustee's decision to administer or to refuse to administer assets of the bank­
rupt."); Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection'', 
59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 848 (1988) ("[Rejection) is simply a bankruptcy estate's decision 
not to assume, because the contract or lease does not represent a favorable or appropriate 
investment of the estate's resources."). 
853 
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ticular leased premises are not needed.7 The second option is to as­
sume the lease, which requires the bankrupt estate to take on the obli­
gations set forth in the lease. 8 The assumption of a lease permits the 
bankrupt party to receive benefits from the lease, such as the contin­
ued use of the property and rent derived from subletting the property, 
at the cost of meeting its obligations.9 According to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 365(d)(4) (the "surrender provision"), if the trustee for the bankrupt 
party fails to either reject or assume the lease within sixty days of filing 
for bankruptcy, the lease is deemed rejected automatically, and the 
trustee must immediately surrender the property to the lessor.10 
Chapter 11 also defines the rights of a lessee when its lessor files 
for bankruptcy and the trustee rejects the lease. Section 
365(h)(l)(A)(ii) (the "applicable nonbankruptcy law provision") 
states that, in such situations, the lessee possesses the right to remain 
on the property for the duration of the lease to the extent permitted 
"by applicable nonbankruptcy law."11 In situations involving the sub­
letting of property, the applicable nonbankruptcy law provision sug­
gests that, when a bankrupt lessee or sublessor rejects the original 
lease, the sublessee of the original lease should also have the right to 
7. See David L. Bleich, Clarence W. Olmsted & Benzion J. Westreich, Tenants Beware: 
Rights Threatened If Lessor in Bankruptcy Rejects a Lease, 211 N. Y.L.J., Feb. 9, 1994, at 5 
(discussing the rationale behind rejecting or assuming a lease, focusing specifically on the 
limitations of the lessee's rights after the lessor rejects the lease). 
8. See Andrew, supra note 6, at 846-47 (stating that assumption "refers to a bankruptcy 
estate's agreement to take on the obligations of the bankruptcy debtor on some pending con­
tract or lease."). 
9. Bartell, supra note 1, at 498 (discussing the options of the bankrupt party under the 
Bankruptcy Code): 
[T]he Code provides them the legal option of assuming the contract, thereby receiving the 
benefits of its provisions at the cost of meeting its obligations on a priority basis, or rejecting 
the contract, thereby foregoing all benefits but absolving themselves of further obligations 
and relegating the other party to the status of pre-petition creditor for unsatisfied liabilities. 
10. 11 u.s.c. § 365(d)(4): 
[I]n a case under any chapter of this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject an unex­
pired lease of nonresidential real property under which the debtor is the lessee within 60 
days after the date of the order for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for 
cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such lease is deemed rejected, and the trustee 
shall immediately surrender such nonresidential real property to the lessor. 
11. § 365(h)(l)(A)(ii) ("[I]f the term of such lease has commenced, the lessee may re­
tain its rights under such lease ... to the extent that such rights are enforceable under appli­
cable nonbankruptcy law."). Examples of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" include state law 
and specific contractual provisions. See, e.g., In re Dial-A-Tire Inc., 78 B.R. 13, 16 (Bankr. 
W.D.N. Y. 1987) (giving subtenants the right to assert relevant state law to protect their 
property interests); Block Props., Inc. v. Am. Nat'! Ins. Co., 998 S.W.2d 168, 176 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1999) (allowing subtenants to rely on terms of the sublease to preserve their interests 
in the lease). 
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remain on the premises as permitted by "applicable nonbankruptcy 
law."1 2 
When a party that subsequently files for bankruptcy subleases 
property to a third party, it is both a lessor and a lessee. It is a lessor 
because it is subleasing the property to another party; but it is a lessee 
because it is leasing the property from another. Because of the multi­
ple roles of the bankrupt sublessor, both the surrender provision and 
the applicable nonbankruptcy law provision seem to apply when the 
sublessor rejects the lease or when the lease is deemed rejected.1 3 
While the applicable nonbankruptcy law provision provides the sub­
lessee with the right to assert nonbankruptcy law to preserve its rights 
under the rejected lease, the surrender provision appears to mandate 
the sublessor to surrender immediately the property to the original 
lessor upon rejection.1 4 The explicit language in section 365 appears to 
provide both the sublessee and the lessor the right to occupy the prop­
erty after the bankrupt sublessor rejects the lease. 
The key question to resolve is whether, in a subletting situation, 
the rejection of a lease due to the trustee's failure to act under the sur­
render provision that results in the immediate surrender of the prop­
erty to the lessor terminates the lease and extinguishes all rights of 
third-party sublessees under the lease. If rejection under this provision 
terminates the lease, a sublessee has no recourse under the applicable 
nonbankruptcy law provision, since the lease no longer exists.1 5 If, 
however, rejection does not terminate the lease, but rather stands as a 
breach of the lease, the sublessee may be able to look to the applicable 
nonbankruptcy law provision to assert its right to remain in the prop­
erty.1 6 
12. § 365 (h)(l)(A)(ii); Dial-A- Tire, 78 B.R. at 16 ("The application of these subsections 
[§ 365(d)(4) and § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii)] produces the anomolous result of the Debtor being ob­
ligated to surrender the Premises, but (the subtenant] not necessarily having to."). 
13. See Dial-A- Tire, 78 B.R. at 16 (recognizing that § 365(d)(4) provides that, upon re­
jection, non-residential real property must be immediately surrendered to the lessor, while § 
365(h)(1) provides that, upon rejection of a lease of non-residential real property, the lessee 
may remain in the property to the extent permitted by applicable nonbankruptcy law"). 
14. Id. 
15. The termination of a lease means that the lease no longer exists and a solvent party 
cannot assert its rights under the lease. Eastover Bank for Sav. v. Sowashee Venture (In re 
Austin Dev. Co.) 19 F.3d 1077, 1082 (5th Cir. 1994) (pointing out that a solvent party could 
not collect damages on a terminated lease); Block Props., 998 S.W.2d at 174 ("If we find that 
Food Barn's rejection of the master lease resulted in its termination, our inquiry would end 
as the termination of the master lease would also terminate all of the rights and obligations 
thereunder, including the respondents' right to possess and sublet the property."); 
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 'JI 365.09(3], at 365-75 (Lawrence P. King ed., LEXIS Publish­
ing 15th ed. 2001) ("[I]f rejection of the lease worked a termination, it would be difficult to 
justify granting the other party to the . . .  'lease a damage claim for rejection, which the lessor 
is given by section 502(g)."). 
16. Tebo v. Elephant Bar Rest., Inc. (In re Elephant Bar Rest., Inc.), 195 B.R. 353, 356 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (recognizing that a sublessee of a rejected lease has the ability to 
assert nonapplicable bankruptcy law to preserve its rights under 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) 
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The future of parties subleasing commercial property depends on 
the resolution of this crucial issue. The surrender provision is invoked 
when a bankrupt sublessor fails to assume or reject a lease within sixty 
days after filing for bankruptcy. 17 If, as a matter of federal law, subles­
sees' rights are terminated pursuant to the surrender provision, their 
rights are forfeited without the opportunity for a court to address their 
interests. Consequently, this policy of automatic forfeiture would in­
crease the transaction costs1 8 of entering into subleases because it 
would force sublessees to perform extensive credit checks to assess the 
probability of potential sublessors' filing for bankruptcy. 
A number of bankruptcy courts have addressed the apparent con­
flict between the surrender provision and the applicable nonbank­
ruptcy law provision. Some courts have determined that, in enacting 
the surrender provision, Congress intended for property to revert im­
mediately to the lessor upon rejection by the bankrupt sublessor, even 
in a subletting situation.1 9 Other courts, relying on the applicable non­
bankruptcy law provision, have held that the property rights of a sub­
lessee are matters of nonbankruptcy law.20 These courts have found 
that once the bankrupt sublessor's actions result in the rejection of a 
because the lease was only breached and not terminated); Block Props., 998 S.W.2d at 174 
(same). See supra note 1 1  for examples of "applicable nonbankruptcy law." 
17. § 365(d)(4). 
18. Transaction costs are defined as "the costs associated with the transfer, capture, and 
protection of rights." YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 4 (2d 
ed. 1997). 
19. E.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Kaplan, 147 B.R. 96, 100 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992) ("[W]hen a 
lease is deemed rejected pursuant to § 365(d)(4), any subleases under that primary lease 
must also be deemed rejected since the sublessee's rights in the property extinguish with 
those of the sublessor."); In re 6177 Realty Assocs., Inc., 142 B.R. 1017, 1019 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 1992) ("Rejection of a non-residential lease results in termination of the lease. Once the 
underlying lease is terminated, leasehold mortgages or sublessees retain no interest that can 
be pursued in bankruptcy court or state court."); In re Child World, Inc., 142 B.R. 87, 89 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[T]he debtor's rejection of the prime lease also resulted in rejec­
tion of the sublease and deprived the sublessee . . .  of any right to occupy the leased premises 
following such rejection."); Keaty & Keaty v. Loyala Assocs. (In re Stalter & Co.), 99 B.R. 
327, 330 (E.D. La. 1989) ("A law that commands two mutually exclusive events cannot be 
obeyed. The only rational view is that § 365(h) does not afford the [subtenant] a right against 
the [sublessor] to occupy the Leased Premises after . . .  the rejection of the Master Lease."). 
20. E.g., Elephant Bar Rest., 195 B.R. at 357 (concluding that the subtenant "retains pos­
sessory rights in the premises to the extent that its sublease is recognized under Colorado 
state law notwithstanding that the lessee/sublessor (i.e., the debtor) retains no further right 
to possess such premises"); Dial-A- Tire, 78 B.R. at 16 ("(T]he dual rejection which occurred 
here will leave (the landlord] and [the subtenant] to vie for possession of the premises ac­
cording to New York Law."); Envireco Int'I Motors, Inc. v. Elmhurst Transmission Corp. (In 
re Elmhurst Transmission Corp.), 60 B.R. 9, 10 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("If a debtor's lease 
is rejected in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(l), affords his subtenants no more than their 
rights under state law."); Block Props., 998 S.W.2d at 174-75 ("After reviewing the language 
of § 365, we find the logic and reasoning of the latter cases, holding that the rejection of an 
unexpired lease constitutes a breach of the lease, not a termination, to be more persua­
sive."). 
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leased premise, sublessees can assert applicable nonbankruptcy law in 
state courts.2 1  By applying the applicable nonbankruptcy law provision 
instead of the surrender provision, these jurisdictions hold that the 
rejection of a lease does not necessarily extinguish the rights of third­
party sublessees to the lease.2 2  
This Note argues that a lease deemed rejected under the surrender 
provision ends the bankrupt sublessor's interest in the lease but does 
not terminate the rights of a sublessee. State property law, rather than 
federal law, should determine the sublessee's rights when the primary 
lease is deemed rejected. Part I argues that Congress intended that 
rejection and termination have different meanings. Congress did not 
evince an intent, contrary to the suggestion of some courts, for a re­
jected lease to be terminated. Congress further demonstrated its intent 
to preserve the rights of sublessees by incorporating the phrase "im­
mediately surrender" into the surrender provision. Part II asserts that, 
since the surrender provision does not terminate third-party sublessee 
interests to the lease, the applicable nonbankruptcy law provision 
should govern the rights of a sublessee. Once a lease is "immediately 
surrendered," the sublessee should have the opportunity to assert its 
rights in state court since the proceedings no longer involve bank­
ruptcy law. This Note concludes, in Part III, that the surrender provi­
sion provides parties with an incentive to enter into subleases because, 
under that provision, the distinction drawn between rejecting and ter­
minating a lease reduces the transaction costs of entering into such an 
agreement. This distinction furthers Congress's desire to encourage 
the efficient use of property through section 365 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
I. CONGRESS'S USE OF REJECTION AND TERMINATION IN SECTION 
365 
Congress intended that rejection and termination have different 
meanings in section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code23 so that a lease re­
jected under the surrender provision would not be terminated. Courts 
21. Some federal courts, when confronting issues raised under § 365(h)(l)(A)(ii), have 
refused to deal with nonbankruptcy issues. See Dial-A-Tire, 78 B.R. at 16 ("That matter is 
not properly before the Court. Nor could it be, since 'federal courts acting in the bankruptcy 
context should deal with state law only to the extent such is necessarily and directly impli­
cated by the bankruptcy issues' " (quoting In re Nanodata Computer Corp., 74 B.R. 766, 771 
(W.D.N.Y. 1987)); Elmhurst Transmission Corp., 60 B.R. at 10 ("The debtor's bankruptcy 
case is near completion and the contemplated litigation between the debtor's former land­
lord and the debtor's former tenant will not affect the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Thus, the 
court abstains from hearing the case . . . .  ") . 
22. See supra note 20 (citing cases preserving sublessees' rights under 
§ 365(h)(l)(A)(ii)). 
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994). 
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reading the surrender provision to find that a sublessee's rights are ex­
tinguished upon the bankrupt sublessor's rejection of the lease inter­
pret the phrase "immediately surrender" to convey Congress's inten­
tion that a rejected lease be terminated.2 4  Although the statutory 
provision does not mention termination,25 these courts reason that 
Congress used rejection and termination interchangeably throughout 
the statute.2 6 Assuming that Congress did not intend different mean­
ings between rejection and termination throughout section 365, these 
courts developed their own interpretation of what it means to "imme­
diately surrender " a lease.27 
This section asserts, to the contrary, that Congress intended to pre­
serve the differences between rejection and termination in section 365. 
Section I.A argues that Congress clearly differentiated between rejec­
tion and termination throughout section 365. Section LB asserts that 
Congress incorporated the terms into the statute with an understand­
ing of the consequences accompanying rejecting and surrendering a 
lease under the common law. Courts, therefore, should adhere to the 
definitions of rejection and surrender used in the statute and under­
stood under the common law, and should not equate the surrendering 
of a lease with the termination of all third-party sublessee interests to 
the lease. 
A. Different Meanings of Rejection and Termination 
The provisions of section 365 may be redundant and complex, but 
Congress's varied usage of rejection and termination does not reflect 
confusion. A careful examination of section 365 indicates that Con-
24. See e.g., Sea Harvest Corp. v. Riviera Land Co., 868 F.2d 1077, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 
1989) ("Surrender of property . . .  has the effect of terminating the enterprise that operates 
there. If Congress intended passive rejection of a lease to be subject to court approval, it 
would not have required the drastic step of immediate surrender. "); 6177 Realty Assocs., 142 
B.R. at 1019 ("The surrender remedy specially provided in § 365(d)(4) by Congress embod­
ies a federal policy to ensure that unless extended by the Court, landlords obtain possession 
of their property within sixty (60) days . . . .  "); In re Giles Assocs., Ltd., 92 B.R. 695, 698 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) ("The breach plus surrender obligation can only be seen as termi­
nation of any of the trustee's or debtor's rights in the leasehold. "); In re Southwest Aircraft 
Servs., Inc., 53 B.R. 805, 810 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985) ("By requiring that upon rejection un­
der § 365(d)(4), 'the trustee shall immediately surrender such nonresidential real property to 
the lessor,' it is clear Congress intended that rejecting a lease terminates the lease. "). 
25. Section 365(d)(4) simply states that, upon rejection, the property should be "imme­
diately surrender[ed) " to the landlord. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4). 
26. See Giles, 92 B.R. at 698 ("[C)ongress could have and should have used consistent 
terms, but Congressional inconsistency creates no presumptions. "); Southwest Aircraft 
Servs., 53 B.R. at 810 ("By requiring that upon rejection under § 365 (d)(4), 'the trustee shall 
immediately surrender such nonresidential property to the lessor,' it is clear Congress in­
tended that rejecting a lease terminates the lease. "). 
27. See supra note 19 (citing cases equating the term "immediately surrender " with ter­
mination). 
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gress intended the differences between rejecting a lease and termi­
nating a lease and drafted the statute with this knowledge, using the 
terms in a consistent manner. The distinct use of these terms by Con­
gress creates the presumption that it intended them to have different 
meanings.2 8  
Congress evinced its understanding of the limited consequences of 
rejecting a contract in section 365. Throughout the section, rejection 
refers to the bankrupt sublessor's decision not to assume a burden­
some lease.2 9  Congress characterized the rejection of a lease as a 
breach of the lease, 30 granting the solvent party to the lease a damages 
claim when the conditions of the lease are not fulfilled.3 1 If the lease 
no longer existed after the rejection (i.e., the lease was terminated), 
then the solvent party would have no recourse since its rights under 
the lease presuppose the existence of the lease.3 2  Thus, a reading of the 
statute equating rejection with termination is inconsistent with Con­
gress's grant of a damage claim to the sublessee.3 3 
Congress also demonstrated its understanding of termination by 
specifically authorizing the termination of leases in section 365 in cer­
tain situations. Termination, commonly understood as the complete 
28. The overwhelming majority of courts have held that the use of different language by 
Congress creates a presumption that it intended the terms to have different meanings. E. g., 
Barmes v. United States, 199 F.3d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Cabell Huntington 
Hosp. Inc. v. Shalala, 101 F.3d 984, 988 (4th Cir. 1996); Legacy Emanuel Hosp. & Health 
Ctr. v. Shalala, 97 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1996); United States. v. Baridal, 31 F.3d 216, 218 
(4th Cir. 1991); Wash. Hosp. Ctr. v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1986); In re Sims, 
185 B.R. 853, 857 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995); Adams v. Hartconn Assocs., Inc., (In re Adams), 
212 B.R. 703, 709 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997). 
29. See Eastover Bank for Sav. v. Sowashee Venture (Jn re Austin Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d 
1077, 1082 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that Congress defined rejection to encompass a power to 
breach rather than a power to terminate); Andrew, supra note 6, at 883 ("[W]hat the estate's 
representative is rejecting is the contract or lease asset, which conceivably could carry con­
tinuing obligations with it into the estate on an administrative basis. Rejection simply pre­
vents the estate from unadvisedly stepping into such liabilities. The liabilities are not repudi­
ated . . .  the lease liabilities remain intact after rejection . . . .  "). 
30. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g). ("[T]he rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of 
the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease."). See Austin, 19 F.3d at 1082 
("Rejection is treated as a breach to preserve the rights of the party whose lease with the 
debtor has been rejected . . . .  "). 
31. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) ("A claim arising from the rejection, under section 365 of this ti­
tle . . .  of an . . .  unexpired lease of the debtor that has not been assumed shall be determined 
and shall be allowed . . . .  " 
32. Austin, 19 F.3d at 1082 ("Rejection is treated as a breach to preserve the rights of 
the party whose lease with the debtor has been rejected by providing a prepetition claim; if 
rejection were deemed a complete, immediate termination, it is not clear what the measure 
of the creditor's claim would be. "). 
33. Id. (recognizing that a rejected lease cannot be terminated because Congress 
granted the solvent party a damages claim under the rejected lease); 3 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, Cj[ 365.09[3], at 365-75 ("[I]f rejection of the lease worked a 
termination, it would be difficult to justify granting the other party to the contract or lease a 
damage claim for rejection, which the lessor is given by section 502(g). "). 
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cessation of the lease, 3 4  is used in sections (h), 3 5  (i), 3 6  and (n)37 of sec­
tion 365 as an option available to the purchaser of an interest in a 
timeshare project, the vendee of real property, or the licensee from 
the debtor of a right to intellectual property if the trustee of the bank­
rupt party has rejected an executory contract. In each of these statu­
tory provisions, Congress used the terms "rejection " and "termina­
tion." 3 8  For example, section 365(h) reads, "[I]f the rejection by the 
trustee amounts to such a breach ... then the lessee under such lease 
may treat such lease as terminated by the rejection . . . .  " 3 9 If 
Congress did not intend the differences between rejection and termi­
nation, then the use of both terms in sections (h), (i), and (n) would be 
superfluous, for every rejected lease would be terminated automati­
cally. Courts have consistently cautioned against interpreting a statute 
in a manner that results in a superfluous term.40 
Furthermore, when specifying the differences between rejection 
and termination, Congress only allowed the solvent party, here the 
34. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, CJ[ 365.09[3], at 365-74 (describing 
the effects of termination) ("If rejection terminates the . . .  lease, such termination may have 
consequences that affect parties other than the debtor and the other party to the . . .  lease. 
For example, termination upon a lessee's rejection may affect the rights of a leasehold mort­
gagee, a sublessee or an assigneed of a lessee's rights. Similarly, termination upon a lessor's 
rejection may affect the rights of a lessee, sublessee or at times, a leasehold mortgagee."). 
35. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(l)(A)(i) states, "If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real 
property under which the debtor is the lessor and . . .  if the rejection by the trustee amounts 
to such a breach as would entitle the lessee to treat such lease as terminated by virtue of its 
terms . . .  then the lessee under such lease may treat such lease as terminated by the rejec-
tion . . . .  " 
36. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i)(l) reads, "If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the 
debtor for the sale of real property or for the sale of a timeshare interest under a timeshare 
plan, under which the purchaser is in possession, such purchaser may treat such contract as 
terminated . . . .  " 
37. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(l)(A) states, "If the trustee rejects an executory contract under 
which the debtor is a licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under such con­
tract may elect . . .  to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such rejection by 
the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the licensee to treat such contract as 
terminated by virtue of its own terms . . . .  " 
38. See supra notes 35-37 (quoting statutory language). 
39. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(l)(A)(i) (1994). 
40. Courts have universally held that statutes should not be construed to make surplus­
age of any provision. E.g., United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 59 (1997); Walters v. Metro. 
Educ. Enters. Inc. , 519 U.S. 202, 209 (1997); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574-75 
(1995); United States v. Nordic Viii., Inc. , 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992); Northwest Forest Res. 
Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1996); Stuart v. Carter (In re Larsen), 59 
F.3d 783, 788 (8th Cir. 1995); Faraone v. City of East Providence, 935 F.Supp. 82, 87 (D.R.I. 
1996); Connecticut Dep't of Income Maint. v. Hoffman (In re Willington Convalescent 
Home, Inc.), 72 B.R. 1002, 1007-08 (D. Conn. 1987), affd, 850 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988), affd, 
492 U.S. 96 (1989); United Res. Sys., Inc. v. Meinhart (In re Meinhart), 211 B.R. 750, 753 
(Bankr. D.Colo. 1997); McCrary v. Barrack (In re Barrack), 201 B.R. 985, 989-90 (Bankr. 
S.D. Cal. 1996); In re Cason, 190 B.R. 917, 928 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995), rev'd, 217 B.R. 598 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). 
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sublessee, the power to terminate a lease.41 The only places in the 
Bankruptcy Code where termination of a lease is permitted 42 are situa­
tions where "the trustee's rejection amounts to such a breach as would 
entitle the [party] to treat such lease ...  as terminated by virtue of its 
own terms .... "43 Under the statute, although the trustee of the debtor 
may reject any of the contracts, termination fails to occur unless the 
solvent party desires that course of action. 
Courts that have defined "immediately surrender" to signify the 
termination of a lease have erred in two significant ways. First, these 
courts ignore the fact that Congress explicitly authorized the situations 
in which it wanted to provide one of the parties with the ability to 
terminate the lease.44 Since Congress did not provide bankrupt subles­
sors with the option to terminate a lease under the surrender provi­
sion, courts should not interpret the provision to grant sublessors with 
such a power.45 Second, Congress gave the power to terminate a lease 
only to the solvent party, and only in situations where the sublessor's 
rejection amounts to a breach of the lease.46 By giving the bankrupt 
sublessor the ability to terminate a lease under the surrender provi­
sion, these courts have interpreted the statute in a manner that di­
rectly contradicts congressional policy. 
41. Eastover Bank for Sav. v. Sowashee Venture (In re Austin Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d 1077, 
1082 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that, under the Bankruptcy Code, "the trustee may reject any of 
these contracts but termination does not occur except at the other party's option"). 
42. The Bankruptcy Code only gives the solvent party the right to terminate the fol­
lowing types of contracts or leases: a timeshare lease under § 365(h)(l), a vendee of real 
property under § 365(i), or a licensee of the debtor for intellectual property ·under 
§ 365(n)(l)(A). The solvent party is permitted to terminate the contract or lease in these 
situations because the bankrupt party's rejection of the contract or lease amounts to such a 
breach that termination is in the best interest of the solvent party. See Austin, 19 F.3d at 
1082-83. 
43. Id. at 1082-83 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(l) and § 365(n)(l)) ("Under an objective 
reading, the provisions of section 365 may be redundant and complex, but Congress was not 
confused in its differing usages of the terms rejection, breach and termination."). 
44. See supra text accompanying note 42 (citing statutory provisions in which Congress 
explicitly authorized termination). 
45. Courts have generally presumed that, where Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute, but omits it in another section of the same act, Congress acted 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. See Bates v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 23, 29-30 (1997); Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 67 (1995); Hayhoe v. Cole (In re 
Cole), 226 B.R. 647, 654 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d.672, 674 
(7th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert denied, 526 U.S. 1113 (1999); Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 
110, 131 (1st Cir. 1998), cert denied, 526 U.S. 1004 (1999); Savage v. IRS (In re Savage), 218 
B.R. 126, 132 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998); Green Tree Credit Corp. v. Thompson (In re 
Thompson), 217 B.R. 375, 378 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Gonzalez-Chavez, 122 
F.3d 15, 17 (8th Cir. 1997); Cramer v. Commissioner, 64 F.3d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Haas v. IRS (In re Haas), 48 F.3d 1153, 1156-57 (11th Cir. 1995). But see Halverson v. Slater, 
129 F.3d 180, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 
F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1997). 
46. See supra note 42 (citing provisions in which Congress authorized the termination of 
contracts or leases). In all those situations, the party empowered to terminate was the sol­
vent party. 
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The statutory provisions illustrate that Congress sought to define 
the rights of both bankrupt sublessors and solvent sublessees in a re­
jected lease. No part of the Bankruptcy Code suggests, however, that 
rejection necessarily leads to the complete cessation of the lease, ter­
minating all third-party sublessee interests to the lease.47 Thus, courts 
should view the decision to reject a lease only as a decision to breach, 
rather than as a decision to terminate the lease.48 
B. Incorporation of Common Law Definitions of Rejection and 
Surrender into the Bankruptcy Code 
It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that, when 
Congress uses terms in a statute that have specific meanings under the 
common law, Congress is presumed to incorporate those meanings 
into the statute unless the statute otherwise dictates.49 Some courts 
have assumed that Congress did not intend for there to be any differ­
ences between termination and rejection and used the terms inter­
changeably.50 This Section argues, however, that the absence of spe­
cific language indicating Congress's intent to deviate from the 
common law definitions of rejection and surrender in section 365, 
along with Congress's consistent use of rejection and termination 
througQout the statute,51 indicates that Congress adhered to the com­
mon law understanding of the terms. 
1. Common Law Definition of Rejection 
Congress's usage of the term rejection in section 365 accords with 
the common law understanding of the term. Under the common law of 
property, the rejection of a lease did not amount to the termination or 
47. See Austin, 19 F.3d at 1083 ("Section 365 offers no textual support for equating 
'breach plus surrender' with 'termination;' to the contrary, it furnishes good reasons for de­
ducing that Congress did not collapse breach or rejection into the termination of a 
lease . . . .  ") . 
48. See supra note 30 (citing statutory provision equating "rejection" with "breach"). 
49. Courts overwhelmingly have held that where Congress uses terms that have accu­
mulated settled meaning under the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute oth­
erwise dictates, that Congress meant to incorporate the established meaning of the terms. 
E. g., Beck v. Prupis, 120 S. Ct. 1608, 1615 (2000); United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 491 
(1997); Field, 516 U.S. at 69; United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1994); Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989); Am. Flint Glass Workers Union v. Anchor Resolution Corp. , 
197 F.3d 76, 80 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, 866 n.85 (5th Cir. 1998). 
50. See supra note 26 (citing cases where courts have assumed that Congress used rejec­
tion and termination interchangeably throughout the Bankruptcy Code). 
51. See supra Section I.A for a discussion on Congress's usage of rejection and termina­
tion. 
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revocation of the lease.5 2 Rejection was simply a bankrupt party's deci­
sion not to assume a lease because the lease did not represent a favor­
able or appropriate investment of the estate's resources. 5 3  Rejection 
did not affect the substantive rights of the parties to the lease, but 
merely meant that the bankrupt estate would not become a party to 
it. 5 4 Thus, the common law meaning of rejection was simply not to as­
sume the obligations in the lease. 
Under the common law, rejecting a lease had the limited effect of a 
breach or abandonment by the debtor or trustee, rather than the 
greater effect of a complete termination of the lease. 5 5 Because the 
rejection of the lease did not terminate all rights under the lease, the 
common law left it open to the sublessee to prove that under non­
bankruptcy law it was entitled to retain its interest when the debtor 
lessee breached the lease.5 6 Properly used, rejection referred to the 
bankruptcy trustee's decision to administer or to refuse to administer 
assets of the bankrupt party, not to the complete termination of the 
lease. 5 7  
Congress could have chosen to depart from the common law 
meaning of rejection. Furthermore, Congress could have departed 
from the overwhelming majority of state property laws holding that 
rejection, merely a breach of the lease, did not terminate the lease 
with respect to third-party sublessees' interests. 5 8  The statute and leg-
52. Andrew, supra note 6, at 921 (describing "rejection" under the common law: "Rejec­
tion of the contract by the estate - the estate's decision not to assume - is not a rescission 
or cancellation of the contract. It is merely the estate's decision not to become obligated on 
it." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
53. Id. at 848-49 ("Simply put, the election to 'assume or reject' is the election to assume 
or not assume, 'rejection' is the name for the latter alternative."). 
54. Id. at 848. 
55. Id. 
56. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, 'II 365.09(3][a], at 365-75 ("When the 
debtor is lessee, recognition that rejection of the lease does not terminate all rights under the 
lease leaves it open to the sublessee or leasehold mortgagee to prove that under nonbank­
ruptcy law it is entitled to retain its interest even if the debtor-lessee breached the lease."). 
57. Andrew, supra note 6, at 848 ("[R]ejection is not the revocation or repudiation or 
cancellation of a contract or lease, nor does it affect contract or lease liabilities."). 
58. Congress has equated the rejection of a lease with a breach of the lease. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 365(g) (1994). Most state courts have held that a breach of the lease does not terminate the 
lease. Eastover Bank for Sav. v. Sowashee Venture (In re Austin Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d 
1073,1083 (5th Cir. 1994) ("It is also worth pointing out . . .  that breach and termination of 
leases . . .  are not synonymous terms under state law."); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cramer, 6 
F.3d 1 102, 1 108 (5th Cir. 1993) (describing options available to landlords under Texas law); 
Blue Barn Assocs. v. Picnic 'N Chicken, Inc. (Jn re Picnic 'N Chicken, Inc.), 58 B.R. 523, 525 
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986) ("California law provides that a breach of a lease is not synonymous 
with the termination of that lease."); In re Storage Tech. Corp., 53 B.R. 471, 474 (Bankr. D. 
Col. 1985) ("Under the law of the state of California, and virtually every other state, a 
breach of a real property lease is not synonymous with termination of the lease.") (footnote 
ommitted); Block Props. Co. v. Am. Nat'! Ins. Co., 998 S.W.2d 168, 174-75 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1999) ("After reviewing these cases and the language of § 365, we find the logic and reason-
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islative history, however, do not convey any evidence of 
Congress's intent to deviate from the common law definitions and 
therefore, the presumption must stand that Congress recognized the 
common law meaning of rejection and intended it as a means for the 
bankrupt lessee to rid itself of unwanted liabilities, without affecting 
the interests of third party sublessees to the lease.59 
2. Protection of Sublessees' Rights by Using the Phrase "Immediately 
Surrender" 
The incorporation of the phrase "immediately surrender" in the 
surrender provision provides further support that Congress incorpo­
rated the common law definition of rejection. Controversy exists over 
whether Congress included the phrase "immediately surrender" in the 
surrender provision to convey that a rejected lease is terminated.6() 
Under the common law of property, however, courts universally have 
held that the rights of sublessees are unaffected by the sublessors' sur­
rendering of property.61 Because the common law preserves a subles­
see's rights in a surrendered lease, Congress's usage of the phrase 
ing of the latter cases, holding that the rejection of an unexpired lease constitutes a breach of 
the lease, not a termination, to be more persuasive."); Wendlandt v. The Sommers Drug 
Stores Co., 551 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (holding that there is no implied ter­
mination of a lease). 
59. See supra note 49 (citing cases supporting the judicial presumption that Congress 
incorporates the common law meaning of terms unless the statute otherwise dictates). 
60. See supra note 19 (citing cases interpreting the term "immediately surrender" to 
mean that a rejected lease is terminated). 
61. Goldberg v. Tri-States Theatre Corp. , 126 F.2d 26, 28 (8th Cir. 1942) ("[ I)t is a well 
settled rule in equity that a surrender by a lessee, where no right of forfeiture has accrued, 
will not ordinarily be allowed to defeat the interests or equities of third persons in the 
term."); Northridge Hosp. Found. v. Pie 'N' Save No. 9, Inc., 232 Cal. Rptr. 329, 332 (Ct. 
App. 1986) ("The general rule is that the rights of a subtenant cannot be affected by a volun­
tary surrender of the master lease."); Parris-West Maytag Hotel Corp. v. Cont'I Amusement 
Co., 168 N.W.2d 735, 738 ( Iowa 1969) ("The surrender of a primary lease does not affect a 
sublease. It remains in full force and effect, and the lessor of the primary lease, or his succes­
sors, becomes the lessor of said sublease."); Warnert v. MGM Props., 362 N.W.2d 364, 368 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) ("The surrender of a primary lease does not affect a sublease. It re­
mains in full force and effect, and the lessor of the primary lease, or his successor, becomes 
the lessor of said sublease." (quoting Parris-West, 108 N.W.2d at 738 (internal quotation 
marks omitted))); McDonald v. May, 69 S.W. 1059, 1061 (Mo. Ct. App. 1902) ("[T)heir [sub­
tenants') rights will not be destroyed or impaired by a surrender of the main lease . . . .  "); 
Shaw v. Creedon, 32 A.2d 721, 723 (N.J. Ch. 1943) ("[T)he sublessee acquires an interest in 
the land which cannot be defeated by any act or omission of the sub-lessor that does not 
derogate from the rights of the original lessor; therefore, after sub-letting, the original lessee 
cannot affect the interest of the sublessee by a surrender to the original lessor."); Baum v. 
Tazwell, 61 A.2d 12, 15 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1948) ("The surrender of a lease by a lessee 
to his lessor, after a sublease, will not be permitted to operate as to defeat the estate of the 
sublessee." (quoting 32 AM. JUR. Landlord and Tenant§ 425, at 345 (1941) (internal quota­
tion marks omitted)); see also JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 471 (4th 
ed. 1998) ("[ I)f the original tenant merely gives up the primary lease voluntarily - 'surren­
ders' it, the rights of possession of sublesses . . .  remain intact." (citation omitted)). 
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"immediately surrender" is consistent with its intention to preserve 
sublessees' rights in a rejected lease. 
Under the common law, the surrender of a primary lease does not 
affect a sublease.62 The lease remains in effect, and the lessor of the 
primary lease becomes the lessor of the sublease, thereby removing 
the bankrupt party from the relationship.63 The surrender does not af­
fect the rights of sublessees, not parties to the original lease, that are 
created in a sublease before the surrender.64 
Thus, a common law interpretation of the phrase "immediately 
surrender" would not terminate the rights of a sublessee in a rejected 
lease. Rather, the common law states that a surrender of a lease by the 
bankrupt lessee does not diminish, in any way, the rights of the subles­
see to the property.65 This interpretation, which preserves the rights of 
sublessees, also accords with the common law understanding that the 
rejection of a lease ends only the bankrupt party's responsibilities in 
the lease.66 Because Congress's usage of the phrase "immediately sur­
render" in section 365 is consistent with the common law understand­
ing of the term, courts should not deviate from such an interpretation 
to hold that the rights of a subtenant are extinguished once the prop­
erty is "immediately surrendered. "67 
62. Northridge Hosp. Found., 232 Cal. Rptr. at 332; Warnert, 362 N.W.2d at 368; Parris­
West, 168 N.W.2d at 738; Baum, 61 A.2d at 14-15; Shaw, 32 A.2d at 723; Goldberg, 126 F.2d 
at 28; McDonald, 69 S.W. at 1061; see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 61, at 470. 
63. Parris-West., 168 N.W.2d at 738. Typically, under the common law, the surrendering 
of a lease when there were no subtenants in the lease resulted in the termination of the lease. 
Usually, surrendering property connoted a tenant's offer to end a tenancy. If the surrender 
was effectuated, then the lessee's liability for future rent was extinguished since the lease no 
longer existed. As described by the Supreme Court of Iowa, "A surrender, as the term is 
used in the law of landlord and tenant, is the yielding up of the estate to the landlord so that 
the leasehold interest becomes extinct by mutual agreement among the parties." Id. at 738. 
64. The rationale behind this rule is that the "subtenant is entitled to protection from 
acts by sublessors that destroy or impair rights the sublessors themselves transferred in a 
sublease agreement." Warnert, 362 N.W.2d at 368. 
65. Northridge Hosp. Found., 232 Cal. Rptr. at 332 ("The general rule is that the rights 
of a subtenant cannot be affected by a voluntary surrender of the master lease."); Parris­
West, 168 N.W.2d at 739 ("The rights of persons not parties to the original lease which have 
accrued before the surrender are not in any way affected thereby. A surrender by the lessee 
does not affect an assignee of the lease, or a sublessee, or anyone holding under the les­
see . . . .  " (quoting 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant§ 1291, at 412); see also supra note 62 (cit­
ing other cases supporting this proposition). 
66. Under the common law, the rejection of a lease does not terminate the lease. It 
merely ends the bankrupt party's obligations under the lease. The retention of subtenant 
rights in a surrendered lease accords with this view of rejection because both views emphasis 
that a rejected lease is not terminated. Third-party rights are preserved in both a rejected 
lease and a surrendered lease. See supra Section l.B.1 for a discussion of the common law 
definition of rejection. 
67. See supra note 49 (citing cases supporting the proposition that Congress incorpo­
rates the common law definitions of terms unless otherwise noted). 
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In summary, because Congress did not evince an intent to deviate 
from the common law understanding of rejection and surrender, the 
presumption stands that Congress incorporated the common law defi­
nitions into the statute. 6 8  This interpretation is furthered by the fact 
that Congress used rejection and termination differently and distinctly 
throughout the Bankruptcy Code 6 9  and incorporated the phrase "im­
mediately surrender" into the surrender provision, which, under the 
common law, preserves the rights of subtenants in a lease deemed re­
jected by a bankrupt sublessor. 
II. PROVIDING SUBLESSEES WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASSERT 
THEIR PROPERTY INTERESTS 
Since, as Part I established, rejecting a lease under the surrender 
provision does not terminate third-party sublessee interests to the 
lease, a sublessee retains its rights in the lease through the applicable 
nonbankruptcy law provision.7 ° Congress included the applicable non­
bankruptcy law provision to provide nonbankrupt lessees and subles­
sees with the opportunity to assert their property interests in a com­
mercial lease.7 1 The provision codifies a balance between the rights of 
a bankrupt lessor and the rights of its tenants.72 The preservation of a 
sublessee's rights under this section also comports with Congress's de­
sire to allow bankrupt parties to rid themselves of unwanted liabilities 
and Congress's desire to encourage the efficient use of commercial 
property. Section II.A argues that Congress intended that the applica­
ble nonbankruptcy law provision preserve the rights of sublessees in a 
lease when the original lessee files for bankruptcy. Section II.B asserts 
68. See supra note 49. 
69. See supra Section I.A for a discussion of Congress's distinct usage of rejection and 
termination. 
70. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(l)(A)(ii) states: 
If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property under which the debtor is the lessor 
and . . .  if the term of such lease has commenced, the lessee may retain its rights under such 
lease . . .  that are in or appurtenant to the real property for the balance of the term of such 
lease . . .  to the extent that such rights are enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
71. See In re Aube, 158 B.R. 567, 568 (Bankr. D.R. !. 1993) ("In construing this section, 
courts have held that 'the statute was designed to preserve a lessee's possessory interests in 
its leashold . . . .  ' "  (quoting In re Lee Rd. Partners, Ltd., 155 B.R. 55, 60 (Bankr. E.D.N. Y. 
1993))); Lee Rd., 155 B.R. at 60 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[C]ourts construing § 365(h) have 
concluded that the statute was designed to preserve a lessee's possessory interests in its 
leasehold . . . .  "); Wood Comm. Fund I, Inc. (Jn re Wood Comm. Fund I, Inc. ), 1 16 B.R. 817, 
818 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990) ("The debtor cannot deprive the lessee of its possessory prop­
erty interest in the leased premises."); LHD Realty Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. (In re LHD 
Realty Corp.). , 20 B.R. 717, 719 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982) ("It is clear that Congress' intent 
was . . .  protecting the property rights of the lessee."). 
72. Lee Rd., 155 B.R. at 60 ("In enacting § 365(h), Congress sought to 'codify a delicate 
balance between the rights of a debtor-lessor and the rights of its tenants . . .  .' " (quoting In 
re Stable Mews Assocs., 41 B.R. 594, 599 (Bankr. S.D.N. Y. 1984)). 
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that the limited rights the sublessee retains in a rejected lease accord 
with the notion of allowing a bankrupt sublessor to rid itself of un­
wanted liabilities. Finally, Section II.C argues that the interpretation 
of the applicable nonbankruptcy law provision giving sublessees the 
right to maintain their interest in a rejected lease accomplishes the 
main goal of the surrender provision, which is to prevent commercial 
property from being unused. 
A. The Rights of Sublessees 
The applicable nonbankruptcy law provision defines the rights of 
sublessees in a rejected lease. 7 3  The provision states that, if the term of 
the lease has commenced and the debtor rejects the lease, the lessee 
may "retain its rights under such lease ... to the extent that such rights 
are enforceable under applicable non bankruptcy law. " 7 4 This section 
explicitly gives a party whose lease has been disrupted by the bank­
ruptcy of its lessor the opportunity to protect its rights by asserting 
applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
The legislative history behind the applicable nonbankruptcy law 
provision evinces Congress's intent to guarantee sublessees the right 
to retain their leasehold interests. In enacting the section, Congress 
sought to balance the rights of a bankrupt party with the rights of its 
tenants by preserving certain expectations of parties to real estate 
transactions. 7 5 Congress concluded that rejection of a lease by a bank­
rupt sublessor should not deprive a sublessee of its estate for the term 
for which it bargained.7 6  To further this goal, Congress gave sublessees 
the right to remain in possession of the property. 7 7  Moreover, the Sen-
73. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(l)(A)(ii) (1994). 
74. § 365(h)(l)(A)(ii) states that: 
[I]f the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property under which the debtor is the les-
sor and . . .  if the term of such lease has commenced, the lessee may retain its rights under 
such lease . . .  and for any renewal or extension of such rights to the extent that such rights 
are enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
75. See Lee Rd., 155 B.R. at 60 ("Congress sought to 'codify a delicate balance between 
the rights of a debtor-lessor and the rights of its tenants' by preserving certain expectations 
of parties to real estate transactions." (quoting Stable Mews, 41 B.R. at 594)); S. REP. No. 
95-989, at 60 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5846 ("If the lessee remains in 
possession, he may offset the rent reserved under the lease . . .  but does not have any af­
firmative rights against the estate for any damages after the rejection that result from the 
rejection."); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349-50 (1977), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6305-06. 
76. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 349-50, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.D. at 6305-06; S. REP. 
No. 95-989, at 60, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5846 ("[T]he tenant will not be deprived 
of his estate for the term which he bargained."). 
77. The Senate Report reads, "The subsection permits the lessee to remain in possession 
of the lease property . . . .  " S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 60, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5846); see also supra note 71 (citing cases construing Congress's intent). 
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ate Report to the Bankruptcy Code specifically emphasized that this 
right to possession applies to both lessees and sublessees.7 8  
Congress's identification of the sublessor as a possible bankrupt 
party 7 9  in the legislative history of the applicable nonbankruptcy law 
provision shows that it anticipated that the bankruptcy would affect 
sublessees.80 The inclusion of sublessors in the legislative history also 
shows that Congress did not intend the bankruptcy of a sublessor to 
disrupt the interests of sublessees. Terminating the rights of sublessees 
upon rejection of the primary lease would not honor Congress's intent. 
Such a holding would undoubtedly disrupt the interests of sublessees, 
who expect their rights in the property to extend until the completion 
of the sublease. Thus, the plain language in the statute and the legisla­
tive history show that Congress intended for nonbankruptcy law to 
govern the rights of sublessees in a rejected lease. 
B. Sublessees ' Limited Rights in a Rejected Lease 
The applicable nonbankruptcy law provision limits the rights that a 
sublessee possesses in a rejected lease to enable the bankrupt subles­
sor to rid itself of unwanted liabilities.8 1 As stated above, the surrender 
provision gives a bankrupt party the ability to reject a commercial 
lease and thereby end its obligations under the lease.8 2 At first glance, 
the applicable nonbankruptcy law provision, which gives sublessees 
the opportunity to preserve their property interests, appears to force 
the bankrupt sublessor to fulfill its commitments set forth in the lease. 
Permitting sublessees to remain on the leased premises makes the 
bankrupt sublessor deal with one of its unwanted obligations, and thus 
runs contrary to a bankrupt party's objectives in rejecting a lease. 
While preserving the sublessee's rights in the sublease, the appli­
cable nonbankruptcy law provision balances the sublessee's possessory 
interest with the bankrupt sublessor's desire to escape the burden of 
78. The Senate Report states, "Subsection (h) protects real property lessees of the 
debtor if the trustee rejects an unexpired lease under which the debtor is the lessor (or sub­
lessor )." S. REP. No. 95-989, at 60, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5846. 
79. See also supra note 77 (citing Senate's inclusion of sublessors as an example of a po­
tential debtor). 
80. Although Congress did not explicitly mention sublessees in the statutory history, its 
reference to sublessors and its strong language protecting the possessory rights of lessees 
strongly suggests that it intended § 365(h)(l)(A)(ii) to dictate the rights of sublessees. 
81. See In re Aube, 158 B.R. 567, 568-69 (D.R. !. 1993) (noting that courts have held that 
the statute allows a "debtor-lessor to escape the burden of providing continuing services to a 
tenant" (quoting In re Lee Rd. Partners, Ltd., 155 B.R. 55, 60) (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993) (in­
ternal quotation omitted)); In re Arden & Howe Assocs., Ltd., 152 B.R. 971, 974 (Bankr. 
E.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that § 365(h) "does not require the landlord to perform its obliga­
tions under the lease."). 
82. 11 u.s.c. § 365(d)(4) (1994). 
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the sublease. 8 3  Specifically, Congress, when enacting the provision, 
protected the interests of the bankrupt sublessor to rid itself of un­
wanted obligations by limiting its responsibilities to sublessees.8 4 These 
limitations further illustrate that Congress intended to balance the in­
terests of sublessees and bankrupt sublessors, which is consistent with 
Congress's usage of the term "rejection" in section 365 of the Bank­
ruptcy Code.8 5 
Following rejection, the applicable nonbankruptcy law provision 
entitles the sublessee to assert nonbankruptcy law to retain the three 
"essential elements of a lease - possession, term and rent."8 6 The 
sublessee's leasehold estate cannot be diminished, changed, or modi­
fied due to a bankruptcy court's intervention. 87 
To maintain a balance between the rights of a sublessee and the 
rights of the bankrupt sublessor, the applicable nonbankruptcy law 
provision limits a sublessee's rights in the property. Specifically, the 
sublessee can only attempt to preserve its right of possession for the 
remainder of the term set forth in the lease for the specified rent. 8 8  
The section does not require the bankrupt sublessor to perform its ob­
ligations under the lease.8 9 For example, the "rejection of the lease re­
sults in the cancellation of covenants requiring performance in the fu­
ture (e.g., the providing of utilities, repair and maintenance, janitorial 
83. See supra note 75 (citing sources recognizing Congress's intent to balance the inter­
ests of both the debtor and the nondebtor). 
84. Upland/Euclid, Ltd. v. Grace Rest. Co. (In re Upland/Euclid, Ltd.), 56 B.R. 250, 252 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a debtor/lessor cannot deprive the lessee of its posses­
sory interest in the lease but "may reject a lease, provide no more services, and stop the flow 
of funds" to the property). 
85. The term "rejection" connotes Congress's desire to balance the interests of the 
bankrupt and solvent parties. Under the common law, rejection allows a bankrupt party to 
rid itself of unwanted obligations, while preserving the rights of a subtenant under the lease. 
See supra Section I.B.l (discussing the limited concept of rejection under the common law). 
86. Arden & Howe, 152 B.R. at 975 (stating that a landlord's obligations in a rejected 
lease are limited); see also Lee Rd., 155 B.R. at 60-61 (holding that the scope of the Bank­
ruptcy Code provision allowing lessee to remain in "possession" of leasehold following trus­
tee's rejection of unexpired lease of real property is not limited to lessees in physical posses­
sion of premises). 
87. See Solon Automated Servs., Inc. v. Wood Comm. Fund I, Inc. (Jn re Wood Comm. 
Fund I, Inc.), 116 B.R. 817, 818 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990) (holding that debtor's/lessor's re­
jection of unexpired lease in no way diminished, changed, or modified lessee's leasehold es­
tate). 
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(l)(A)(ii) (1994); see also In re Harborview Dev. 1986 Ltd. 
P'ship, 152 B.R. 897, 901 (D. S.C. 1993); Arden & Howe, 152 B.R. at 974; In re Carlton Rest., 
151 B.R. 353, 357 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993); Bleich et al., supra note 7 (discussing the rights 
that a lessee has in a rejected lease). 
89. Arden & Howe, 152 B.R. at 974 (Section 365(h)(2) "protects the lessee from rent 
increases or other exactions by the landlord except as provided in the lease. But it does not 
require the landlord to perform its obligations under the lease"). 
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services)" by the bankrupt sublessor.90 The sublessee also does not 
have the power to assign the lease to a third party.9 1 Furthermore, a 
sublessee's rights against the sublessor for damages occurring after 
rejection caused by the nonperformance of any of the bankrupt party's 
obligations under the lease are restricted to an offset against the rent 
reserved under the lease.92 The sublessee has no other rights against 
the sublessor for damages resulting from rejection.9 3 The sublessor 
may reject the lease, provide no more services, and, consequently, stop 
the flow of incoming funds that benefit the sublessee.9 4  The only thing 
it cannot do is deprive the sublessee of its property interest in the 
leased premises.9 5  
Congress limited the remedies available to the sublessee to main­
tain a balance between the interests of the bankrupt sublessor and the 
rights of the sublessee.9 6 While the Code provides sublessees with a 
limited number of rights, it does not purport to saddle the sublessor 
with an unwanted obligation for any period beyond that required to 
prevent the dispossession of the sublessee.97 This balance is consistent 
with the notion that by rejecting a lease, the bankrupt sublessor seeks 
90. LHD Realty Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. (In re LHD Realty Corp.) , 20 B.R. 717, 
719 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982). ' 
91. Carlton, 151 B.R. at 356-57 (holding that a tenant who remained in possession of 
leased premises after bankrupt landlord had rejected the lease had only a personal right to 
possession and therefore could not assign the lease). 
92. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(l)(B). 
93. § 365(h)(l)(B) states: 
If the lessee retains its rights under subparagraph (A)(ii), the lessee may offset against the 
rent reserved under such lease for the balance of the term after the date of the rejection of 
such lease and for the term of any renewal or extension of such lease, the value of any dam­
age caused by the nonperformance after the date of such rejection, of any obligation of the 
debtor under such lease, but the lessee shall not have any other right against the estate or the 
debtor on account of any damage occurring after such date caused by such nonperformance. 
94. The only thing the sublessor must do is allow the sublessee to remain in the prop­
erty. The sublessor does not have to provide any help to the sublessee to maintain the prop­
erty. Solon Automated Servs., Inc. v. Wood Comm Fund I, Inc. (In re Wood Comm. Fund I, 
Inc.), 116 B.R. 817, 818 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990) ("[R)ejection of the lease results merely in 
the cancellation of covenants requiring performance in the future . . .  by the debtor; rejection 
does not terminate the lease completely so as to divest the lessee of his estate in the prop­
erty." (quoting LHD Realty, 20 B.R. at 719 (quoting 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra 
note 15, 'll 365.09, at 354-43 (15th ed. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alternation 
in the original)). 
95. Id. 
96. See In re Stable Mews Assocs., Inc. , 41 B.R. 594, 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); LHD 
Realty, 20 B.R. at  719; see also S.  REP No. 95-989, at  60 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5846; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 349 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6306-06. 
97. See Carlton 151 B.R. at 356 ("That Code section . . .  allows only a lessee the choice to 
remain in possession under the terms of the lease. It does not provide that the lease contin­
ues, but merely accords a lessee the choice to remain in a rented premise under the terms of 
the lease."). 
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to rid itself of the burdensome obligations set forth in the lease. This 
framework also is consistent with the idea that Congress used the 
word "rejection" in section 365 to preserve the rights of sublessees in a 
lease. 
C. Facilitating the Efficient Use of Commercial Property 
Providing sublessees the opportunity to preserve their interests in 
a rejected lease assures the use of commercial property, which is one 
of the main purposes behind the surrender provision.9 8 Courts holding 
that a sublessee has no rights in a rejected lease have interpreted the 
provision to represent a federal policy to ensure that a bankruptcy 
does not result in the long-term vacancy of commercial property.99 The 
preservation of a sublessee's interest in a rejected lease, however, ac­
cords with this intention because the commercial property will not be 
left vacant when the surrender provision is invoked. 
The surrender provision states that a lease is rejected automati­
cally if the "trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of 
nonresidential real property . . .  within 60 days."100 After the rejection, 
the trustee needs to "immediately surrender" the lease to the lessor.101 
Congress enacted this section to remedy the long-term vacancy or par­
tial operation of space by a bankrupt tenant.10 2 As described by 
Senator Orrin Hatch, 
Because of the unprecedented number of bankruptcy cases and the con­
sequent delays in the bankruptcy courts, tenant space has been vacated 
for extended periods of time before the bankruptcy court forced the trus­
tee to decide whether to assume or reject the lease . . . .  The bill would 
lessen the problems caused by extended vacancies and partial operation 
of tenant space by requiring that the trustee decide whether to assume or 
reject nonresidential real property within 60 days after [the party files fqr 
bankruptcy ].1 ° 3  
Thus, Congress passed the surrender provision to ensure the use of 
commercial property. 
98. See Eastover Bank for Sav. v. Sowashee Venture (In re Austin Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d 
1077, 1081 (5th Cir. 1994) (describing how § 365(d)(4) was enacted to lessen the vacancy pe­
riod for lessors to debtors by requiring a firm 60-day assume/reject decision). 
99. See, e.g. In re Bernard, 69 B.R. 13, 14 (Bankr. D. Haw.) ("Under Section 365(d)(4), 
this immediate surrender of the premises upon rejection of the lease was to enable the les­
sors to once again rent the premises and to earn income from the demised premises."); see 
also supra note 24 (citing courts finding Congress's desire to ensure that commercial prop­
erty is not left vacant). 
100. 11 u.s.c. § 365(d)(4) (1994) 
101. § 365(d)(4). 
102. 103 CONG. REC. 20,088 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 598. 
103. Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 598-99. 
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Although the legislative history of the surrender provision does 
not refer specifically to sublessees, retaining sublessees avoids the 
problems that the statute aimed to solve. The sublessee occupies the 
leased premise when the bankrupt sublessor files for bankruptcy and 
rejects the lease. In most situations, the disruption caused by rejecting 
a lease will not even be apparent because the space will continue to be 
rented even after the rejection.10 4 Preserving the rights of the subles­
see, therefore, will ensure the occupation of the leased premises.105 
To summarize, the legislative history behind the applicable non­
bankruptcy law provision suggests that Congress intended that the 
provision protect the rights of sublessees when their bankrupt subles­
sors reject a lease pursuant to the surrender provision. The limited 
rights afforded to the sublessee under applicable nonbankruptcy law 
provision are consistent with the idea that a bankrupt sublessor can rid 
itself of its burdensome obligations by rejecting a lease. This interpre­
tation is also consistent with the primary purpose behind the surrender 
provision, which is to ensure the use of commercial property. 
Ill. AUTOMATIC FORFEITURE POLICY INCREASES TRANSACTION 
COSTS 
One of the fundamental purposes of section 365, particularly the 
surrender provision, is to encourage the efficient use of property.1 0 6  An 
interpretation of the surrender provision justifying the automatic for-
104. The Fifth Circuit adopted a similar argument to preserve the rights of a solvent 
leasehold mortgagee in a rejected lease. See Eastover Bank for Sav. v. Sowashee Venture (In 
re Austin Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d 1077, 1081 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994). The Eastover court stated: 
It is true that § 365(d)(4) is part of the 1984 'shopping center' amendments to the Bank­
ruptcy Code and that it sought to lessen the vacancy period for lessors to debtors in such 
cases by requiring a firm 60-day assume/reject decision. This goal of protecting lessors does 
not conflict with the protection of leasehold mortgagee's rights, however, because a mortga­
gee would have to comply with the lease in order to take it over from the debtor. The lessor 
would have to be satisfied. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
105. As the next Section will illustrate, allowing the landlord the choice to either con­
tinue the sublessor's lease or terminate it and release the property would not lead to the effi­
cient use of the property. Such a policy would increase the transaction costs associated with 
entering into subleases because of the uncertainty in property rights that would be created if 
the sublessor filed for bankruptcy. For example, in a regime that provided landlords with the 
above option, a sublessee would have to perform extensive background checks of the subles­
sor as well as enter into a second contract with the landlord to ensure that its operations will 
be unaffected by the bankruptcy. These unnecessary efforts would be avoided by preserving 
the sublessee's rights in a rejected lease. 
106. See 130 CONG. REC. 20,088 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 598 (describing 
that one of the problems that the bill was seeking to remedy was the misuse of commercial 
property) ("The first problem which this bill would remedy is the long-term vacancy or par­
tial operation of space by a bankrupt tenant."); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 349 (1977), re­
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A. 5963, 6305-06; see also supra Section 11.C (discussing the pur­
poses behind the enactment of § 365( d)( 4 )). 
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feiture of the sublessee's right to occupy the leased premises would 
lead to the inefficient use of property by increasing the transaction 
costs of entering into subleases.107 
A policy of automatic forfeiture would increase the transaction 
costs of entering into subleases because sublessees would have to per­
form extensive credit checks of their sublessors before entering into 
such agreements to avoid entering into subleases with parties likely to 
go bankrupt.108 The costs of these credit checks would depend on the 
availability of information. After performing these credit checks, par­
ties who anticipate that their sublessor may file for bankruptcy will be 
deterred from entering into such agreements. If the sublessor files for 
bankruptcy, then the sublessees' rights would be extinguished auto­
matically, as a matter of law. 
A simple example illustrates the detrimental consequences that 
would result from a policy of automatic forfeiture following rejection. 
Assume that Company X enters into a fifteen-year lease with Com­
pany Y, where Company X is the lessor and Company Y is the lessee. 
During the fourth year of the lease, Company Y decides that it wants 
to relocate its business to another state. To balance its desire to relo­
cate with its obligations under the lease, Company Y begins to solicit 
potential sublessees for the property. 
Company Z expresses interest in entering into a sublease for the 
commercial property. Company Z knows that if Company Y files for 
bankruptcy during the course of its subtenancy, its rights to the prop­
erty will be extinguished, as a matter of law, without Company Z 
having the ability to assert its interest in the property. Therefore, be­
fore entering into the sublease, Company Z will perform an extensive 
investigation into the credit history of Company Y. The investigation 
will force Company Z to expend unnecessary financial resources to as­
sess Company Y's likelihood of filing for bankruptcy. 
In short, the forfeiture policy increases the transaction costs of en­
tering into subleases because potential sublessees would have to per­
form extensive credit checks of the sublessor's financial history. Al-
107. See BARZEL, supra note 18, at 4-5. Barze! explains why the presence of these costs 
is inefficient. He argues that, when transaction costs are high, rights are never complete be­
cause people will not find it worthwhile to gain the entire potential of their assets. The rea­
son is that, relative to their value, some of the attributes of the assets, in this case, the sub­
lease, are costly to measure. Consequently, the attributes of the assets are not known to the 
fullest extent to prospective owners. Thus, the transfer of these assets entails costs resulting 
from the party's (the sublessee's) attempts to determine the valued attributes of these assets 
and from its attempt to capture those attributes that, because of the transaction costs, are 
poorly delineated. Barze! concludes, "Exchanges that otherwise would be attractive may be 
forsaken because of such exchange costs." Id. at 5 .  
108. Potential sublessees may already perform background investigations of sublessors. 
In a regime where rejection equals termination, however, these investigations would have to 
be unnecessarily comprehensive because of the draconian ramifications of an incorrect as­
sessment of the sublessor's chances of filing for bankruptcy. 
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though generally it is good public policy to encourage parties to per­
form investigations into the financial background of other parties in 
the contract, a policy of automatic forfeiture imposes draconian penal­
ties for performing incomplete investigations. 109 In the above example, 
if Company Z incorrectly assumes that Company Y has no chance of 
filing for bankruptcy, and Company Y subsequently files for bank­
ruptcy, then Company Z loses its rights in the property as a matter of 
law. 1 10 
The harsh consequence of performing incomplete credit investiga­
tions, along with the relatively high number of commercial entities 
that file for bankruptcy each year,1 1 1  significantly increases the transac­
tion costs of entering into commercial subleases.1 1 2 This unintended 
policy consequence runs contrary to the objectives of section 365, 
which through the surrender provision seeks to encourage the most 
efficient use of property.1 1 3  
An interpretation of the surrender provision that protects the 
sublessee's rights in a rejected lease eliminates these unnecessary 
transaction costs. Sublessees would not have to perform extensive 
credit investigations to assess the likelihood of the sublessor filing for 
bankruptcy because their property interests would not hinge on the 
sublessor's financial status. For the same reason, sublessees would not 
have to base their decision to enter into subleases on sublessors' 
chances of bankruptcy. The elimination of these transaction costs, 
which unnecessarily hinder the completion of sublease agreements, 
would honor Congress's desire to facilitate the efficient exchange of 
property. 
109. See LHD Realty, 20 B.R. at 720 ("It would be dangerous precedent . . .  to be in the 
business of reforming (or terminating) contracts and leases because of changing economic 
circumstances. Depending on the peaks and valleys of our economic circumstances, the court 
would be considering in every case whether a contract was equitable or inequitable." (quot­
ing In re Pin Oaks Apartments, 7 B.R. 364, 372 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alternation in original))). 
1 10. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (supporting proposition that lessee has no 
rights in a terminated lease). 
1 1 1 .  In 1998, over 44,000 businesses filed for bankruptcy in the United States. ABI 
World, Filing Statistics, http://www.abiworld.org/statslnewstatsfront.html (2001) (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2001). 
1 12. This section focuses on only one particular transaction cost, performing credit in­
vestigations of potential sublessors, created by a system equating rejection and termination. 
This system would also create other transaction costs, including costs of associated with the 
disruption of the sublessee's business. These costs include a potential loss of customers, 
finding another piece of commericial property, and moving expenses associated with the re­
location of the business. 
1 13. See supra text accompanying note 106 (discussing purposes behind 11 U.S.C. 
§ 365(d)(4)). 
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CONCLUSION 
The above analysis indicates that sublessees in a commercial lease 
should be able to preserve their interests in a rejected lease by assert­
ing applicable nonbankruptcy law. In drafting the Bankruptcy Code, 
Congress adopted the distinct, common law definitions of rejection, 
termination, and surrender. Congress did this in order to balance the 
bankrupt sublessor's interest in ridding itself of unwanted obligations 
with the sublessee's desire to continue its occupation of the leased 
premises. Congress maintained this balance by permitting sublessees 
to remain in the leased property after the rejection of a lease, while 
limiting their rights in the property. 
This interpretation of the statute, while preserving the rights of the 
sublessee, also facilitates the efficient use of property by reducing the 
high transaction costs associated with sublessees' performing costly in­
vestigations to assess the sublessor's chances of bankruptcy. This in­
terpretation also allows sublessees to enter into subleases confidently 
without the fear of the bankruptcy of sublessors disrupting their busi­
ness operations. 
